



ber 2015 • Issue N
um














tel +44 (0)20 7065 0880













Estimating the costs of compliance options for the BWC  • James Revill and Caitríona McLeish  1
Verification watch       
Progress investigating chemical weapons use in Syria  •  Giuseppe Di Luccia   6
Paris Agreement: a new global action plan to reduce climate change? • Joy Hyvarinen          7
 
Implementation  watch
 ‘Hiroshima on a light switch’ condemned in US court • Giuseppe Di Luccia             9
  
Science and technology scan
Noble gas detection for CTBT monitoring • David Keir                                                                                       10
Breaking news: DPRK announces fourth test                                                                                                         10
Programme News                11
Publications News                                                                                                                                                              13
In memoriam                                                                                                                                                                        15











Estimating the costs of 
compliance options for 
the BWC
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is neither in crisis nor at a crossroads, and as 
no state party has, to date, sought to withdraw from the convention, it can be assumed that 
each continues to see benefits from being within the BWC regime. Indeed, the BWC in-
tersessional processes (ISP), which was designed to, inter alia, sustain multilateral discussion 
around biological disarmament following the acrimonious collapse of the protocol negotia-
tions in 2001, have arguably exceeded expectations. Moreover, during a Special Session of 
the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference in 2015, the former Pakistani 
Ambassador, Masood Khan who presided over the Sixth BWC Review Conference in 2006, 
suggested that the BWC ‘is by far the most successful WMD non-proliferation and disarma-
ment regime’.
Most successful or not, over the course of the Third ISP, a significant number of states across 
all regional groups have expressed an interest in strengthening the convention, a topic which 
has largely been avoided since 2001. Since 2012, several states—including Australia, Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the UK and the US—have submitted working papers 
referring to the ‘need to talk about compliance’. In 2015, the Russian Federation proposed 
an ‘Open-ended Working Group’ to ‘draft proposals to strengthen the Convention’; France, 
the Benelux states and several other states also appear to be pursing peer review type 
mechanism to look at aspects of national implementation, and yet other states continue to 
maintain the position that the only sustainable means of strengthening the convention is 
through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding, verification protocol. 
It appears then that many states parties ostensibly support doing ‘something’ to strengthen 
the BWC; but there is no consensus on how, nor necessarily an appreciation of the financial 
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costs associated with different options. Whilst biological 
disarmament is priceless, in times of austerity, the financial 
costs of options need to be considered, not least to avoid some 
of the sorts of shocks that befell the last review conference in 
2011, when a small number of states were unable to accept a 
small increase in the envisaged budget for the BWC. 
Compliance 
Compliance with the BWC can be understood as the adher-
ence to the obligations, both positive and negative, that states 
have agreed to in the process of signing and ratifying the 
convention. The term ‘positive obligations’ refers to those 
things states parties have committed to do and are relatively 
easy to determine by indicators, such as domestic prohibitions 
on biological weapons (for further examples see the UK work-
ing paper ‘We Need to Talk about Compliance: A Response 
to BWC/MSP/2012/WP.11’). In contrast, ‘negative obliga-
tions’ are those things that states parties have committed not 
to do and include activities, such as the development of bio-
logical weapons. Compliance assessment for negative obliga-
tions can be informed by a number of indicators; however, 
proving a negative—such as the absence of a biological weap-
ons programme in a state—to the satisfaction of all parties is 
comparatively more difficult. 
These obligations under the BWC are explicitly, if at points 
ambiguously, laid out in the text of the convention—for 
example, what is required under Article IV in terms of ‘pre-
vention’ remains unclear. However, countries differ in their 
interpretation and (implicit) prioritisation of these obliga-
tions, with understandings changing over time in response 
to, inter alia, evolving perceptions of biological weapons risks 
and shifting geopolitical interests. Narrowing down differ-
ences in interpretations and agreeing a balanced package of 
measures is a difficult task, but one that may be important 
in moving forward. 
What is the problem? 
Compliance indicators can only ever begin to build a partial 
picture of whether a state is in compliance or not; with ad-
ditional material required to build a more complete and ac-
curate picture from which states can reach an informed 
judgment. Moreover, caution is needed in using indicators 
based exclusively on past programmes, if there is adequate 
available information on such programmes. Future pro-
grammes may follow similar pathways to those of the past, 
but equally they may have different footprints, and exploit 
different technologies and/or facilities to very different ends. 
Indeed, strengthening the BWC assumes there is agreement 
on the nature of the problem to which the BWC is the solu-
tion in the twenty-first century, and this may not be the case. 
Perhaps wrongly, today’s view is that negotiations on the BWC 
emerged as a response to concerns over large-scale, overt bio-
logical weapons use. However, biological weapons have a 
number of utilities ranging from mass destruction, to small-
scale incapacitation and economic sabotage; they can be used 
overtly or covertly against humans, animals and plants by 
states, non-state organisations and indeed lone actors. How 
one sees the problem of biological weapons has a consider-
able bearing on whether strengthening the BWC is worth it 
and, if so, what a strengthened BWC would look like.  
 
Options for compliance 
The existence of different priorities and visions suggests it 
may be useful to consider a range of options for strengthen-
ing the BWC. What follows is a menu of compliance-related 
options that could be considered separately—or in combina-
tion—either instead of, or additional to, a future ISP. As with 
any menu, there are costs associated with each option. In this 
article, they are largely presented in the form of an estimate 
of conference servicing costs, based on those figures outlined 
in the official 2011 document on the (revised) Estimated costs 
of the intersessional programme of the Convention to be held 
from 2012-2015. Such estimations serve only as an indicator 
of a fraction of the total costs which remains unadjusted for 
inflation, yet it remains a fraction that can be reasonably 
anticipated. This does however exclude, for example, the costs 
associated with implementation support, travel and accom-
modation, and funding for informal meetings. Also excluded 
are ‘invisible’ costs such as time for preparing and producing 
working papers, a cost which is unlikely to be evenly shared; 
political costs that may be borne in the pursuit of any specific 
option; and potential (missed) opportunity costs incurred in 
the selection of any particular option over another.
Option 1: maintaining the status quo 
One option is for states parties to maintain the status quo and 
agree a fourth ISP devoid of any discussion on compliance. 
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Failure to include compliance would not necessarily under-
mine the norm against biological weapons, nor collapse the 
convention. Neither would it affect the continuation of ex-
ogenous activities that could reinforce the BWC, such as 
ongoing efforts to revitalise the UN Secretary General’s In-
vestigatory Mechanism; efforts to improve Global Health 
Security; explorations of peer review; or measures to improve 
laboratory management, such as ISO 35001 on Laboratory 
biorisk management systems, which is envisaged as including 
certifiable internationally agreed standards for laboratory 
management. As such, continuing with the status quo—at 
an estimated cost of $610,000 per annum for the conference 
servicing of two annual meetings—would not worsen the 
situation. However, it is questionable whether this is the best 
use of states’ time and resources and unclear what this means 
for the sustainability of interest in the BWC.   
Option 2: compliance reporting and 
clarification 
A second option is for states parties to submit background 
materials on their national compliance. Such an activity is 
one of the underlying reasons for the Confidence Building 
Measure (CBM), including Form E, which obligates states 
to annually account for national legislation, regulations and 
other measures. It also has precedent in, inter alia, the reports 
submitted by Canada, the Czech Republic and Switzerland 
(the ‘National Implementation of the BTWC: compliance 
assessment: update’) in 2012, and the national compliance 
reports that have been submitted to Review Conferences since 
1980. In 2011, 36 states submitted such reports with contri-
butions averaging about three and a half pages and divided 
between an article-by-article approach and a thematic ap-
proach. The cost of these reports will primarily be borne in 
officials’ time and will depend on the extent of materials al-
ready available.
Thus far, any issues arising from compliance reports have 
seemingly been dealt with on a bilateral basis. However, if 
compliance reports are considered useful—or could poten-
tially be strengthened, standardised and/or submitted annu-
ally—then there may be value in allocating time for discussion 
and clarification of any issues that may arise. Thus states par-
ties could consider allocating a three-hour session in a future 
provisional programme of work to a closed session mandated 
to review and discuss compliance reports. 
Based on the estimated conference servicing costs for the third 
ISP, a single three-hour session would entail an annual cost 
of $34,210. If unused, the session could be reallocated for 
other activities. 
Option 3: standing agenda item on
compliance 
Another minimalist option could be agreement to a standing 
agenda item on compliance at the BWC’s Eighth Review 
Conference in late 2016. In circumstances where there is 
ambiguity around certain obligations, ‘discussion, and promo-
tion of common understanding and effective action’ could 
be useful to narrow down differences in interpretations and 
potentially lay the foundations for future work. Standing 
agenda items have typically been dealt with annually through 
two sessions at the Meetings of Experts in the summer and 
one subsequent session of the Meeting of States Parties in the 
winter. 
Based on the estimated conference servicing costing for the 
third ISP, a standing agenda item on compliance can be 
costed at $95,210 per annum. 
 
Option 4: Peer Review option 
A further activity that could facilitate progress in compliance 
is peer review or some other form of  systematic examination 
of the performance of a state in a selected area undertaken 
by other states. There are several variants on the peer review 
concept that have been explored, as evidenced in the work of 
France and, subsequently, the Benelux countries. In addition 
to these, it was announced in the 2015 Meeting of States 
Parties that three other states—Germany, US and Canada—
appear to be following suite with some form of peer review 
type activity. These models differ in the extent they directly 
relate to compliance: the French model explored best prac-
tices in areas of biosafety, biosecurity and export controls, 
whereas the Benelux model focused on biodefence and na-
tional legislation and included both documentary assessment 
and visits to facilities. 
Peer review is no substitute for verification, but nor is it cur-
rently a distraction as it provides a greater understanding of 
the processes through which compliance could be demon-
strated, as well as encouraging scrutiny over national activities 
and sharing of lessons learned and better practices. Moreover, 
it is a flexible tool that can be applied to a number of other 
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BWC obligations, including, potentially, better practices in 
assistance and international cooperation (see for example 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee Peer Reviews 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/). 
The costs of peer review will depend upon the scope and 
duration of the exercise; however, as a guide, the French peer 
review process cost $31,959 inclusive of travel, accommoda-
tion, subsistence and the production of the report. With the 
Benelux model, costs were primarily borne in terms of offi-
cials’ time. 
Option 5: VEREX 2.0 
Science and technology (S&T) of relevance to assessing 
compliance has changed considerably since the work of the 
Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and 
Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific 
and Technical Standpoint (VEREX) in the early 1990s. In-
deed, the VEREX report acknowledged some of the measures 
assessed as being limited by availability and ‘stages of develop-
ment’; and whilst the central conclusions of VEREX may still 
hold true in that some ‘measures would contribute to strength-
ening the effectiveness’ of the BWC, advances in S&T since 
1994 will have almost certainly effected evaluations of the 21 
verification measures identified and potentially created a 
number of new tools. Furthermore, there has been a signifi-
cant shift in risk perceptions that such a group could use-
fully explore to provide a solid technical foundation for po-
litical discussion. 
As such, there could be merit to revisiting the S&T of rele-
vance to compliance, taking into account developments in 
technologies such as biosensors and satellites; new online 
sources and means of information monitoring; new prac-
tices in the life sciences that could enhance or undermine 
efforts to strengthen the convention; and new knowledge 
from past programmes. As in the past, such a suggestion is 
likely to inflame political sensitivities. It will also require fi-
nancial support and time, particularly from technical experts. 
The VEREX group, for example, produced 176 working 
papers and 84 non-papers. 
VEREX met four times between 1992 and 1993, each time 
for two working weeks. Using estimated conference servicing 
costs for the third ISP, an equivalent set of expert meetings 
can be estimated at $1,368,400 per year. In addition there 
would be considerable time costs in updating background 
materials, something that could be aided by international 
scientific organisations undertaking technical discussion 
outside of the main conference room, thereby eliciting 
greater scientific debate. 
Option 6: open-ending working group
The concept of an open-ended working group (OEWG) has 
precedent in a number of other agreements, such as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In the BWC context, in 2011, 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand submitted a ‘Proposal for 
a working group to address compliance issues’, which sought 
to establish an OEWG on compliance, with meetings sug-
gested as forming part of an annual Meetings of Experts to 
‘discuss and develop common understandings on issues rel-
evant to enhancing assurance of compliance with the BWC’. 
The proposal focused on two key questions: what constitutes 
compliance and how can this be demonstrated? As such, it 
offered one useful route into both conceptual and practical 
discussion on compliance. However, the proposal failed to 
gain significant traction in 2011. 
In 2015, the Russian Federation proposed the establishment 
of an OEWG ‘to elaborate on a basis of consensus appropri-
ate measures and draft proposals to strengthen the convention 
to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument’ 
as language for inclusion in the report of the Eighth Review 
conference. The proposal envisages work in a number of ar-
eas including, inter alia, transparency, national implementa-
tion, monitoring S&T, strengthening international coopera-
tion, and a mechanism for assistance and protection against 
biological weapons in the event of violation of the convention. 
As such, the Russian proposal arguably provides a broad 
package of measures that may appeal to cross-regional groups 
and potentially stimulate higher-level interest in the BWC. 
It is, however, unclear whether this proposal will garner suf-
ficient support: by avoiding reference to verification, some 
will see this as too modest; by proposing a return to negotia-
tions, yet others will see this as a potentially muddy road to 
nowhere. 
Moreover, the proposed Russian OEWG may be more ex-
pensive with a number of meetings likely to be needed to 
reach consensus on the broad range of issues identified, par-
ticularly if the objective is achieving a legally binding agree-
ment. As such, the best indicator of costing perhaps remains 
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the work of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG), which worked to-
wards the development of a Protocol to the BWC over the 
course of the mid to late 1990s, and which can be estimated 
as costing $3,245,062 per annum for conference servicing, 
based on 2011 prices (see below).
Option 7: the Protocol
For many states, a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding, 
verification protocol is the only sustainable means of strength-
ening the convention. Some form of verification remains a 
‘gold standard’ for disarmament agreements and something 
to continue to aspire to, not least, as this would provide the 
BWC with ‘teeth’, presumably in the form of some mechanism 
for monitoring, assessment and evaluation of compliance. 
However, even if some form of verification were technically 
feasible, returning to the protocol will be politically divisive, 
time consuming and expensive. The 24 sessions of the AHG 
conducted between January 1995 and August 2001 offi-
cially consisted of 332 working days of meetings in Geneva. 
Based on current estimated costs of a five-day Meeting of 
Experts, an equivalent set of meetings would now amount to 
a total of $22,715,440, or $3,245,062 per year. This estimate 
excludes the cost of travel, accommodation and time allotted 
to the production of working papers, of which there was a 
total of 455 published. 
If successful, such a figure is perhaps a small price to pay for 
a BWC verification system, but were efforts to fail again, it 
would be an extremely expensive failure on many levels. Of 
course negotiations on some form of protocol could proceed 
much quicker than past efforts, facilitated by elements of the 
work of the AHG that may retain relevance (as well as aspects 
of work in the ISP). Yet it is also likely that much of the work 
of the AHG would need both re-doing to account for techni-
cal changes and/or evolving perceptions of security since 
2001, and re-learning because of the lack of institutional 
memory. All of this makes the protocol an ambitious yet 
high-risk option.  
Reflections
The value of effective, sustained biological disarmament—
undertaken in a manner that encourages peaceful coopera-
tion—is priceless. However, achieving this will entail financial 
and political costs, and the choice of any one route towards 
strengthening the convention over another may entail op-
portunity costs. None of these costs can be realistically pre-
dicted in advance; but if there is appetite to do something 
towards strengthening the convention in a time of austerity, 
then financial costs cannot be ignored. 
This note has provided a crude estimate of option costs based 
on the conference service costs as presented in BWC/CONF.
VII/4/Rev.1 for the third ISP. As noted earlier, these esti-
mated costs are not a comprehensive estimate of all financial 
costs that can be associated with any particular option; nor 
do they take into account the cost of the three-person Imple-
mentation Support Unit (ISU), which may need to be ex-
panded should states wish to undertake more ambitious ac-
tivities. Deciding whether any of these options—or combina-
tions of options—is worth it will depend on whether states 
parties are sufficiently concerned to act; and, if so, how far 
they are willing and able to agree to provide political will and 
financial support to strengthening the convention by develop-
ing a system in which the benefits of participation in bio-
logical disarmament ever more outweigh the costs of not 
participating.•
James Revill 
Research Fellow (SPRU—Science Policy Research Unit), Univer-
sity of Sussex
Caitríona McLeish
Senior Research Fellow (SPRU—Science Policy Research Unit), 
University of Sussex
The authors would like to thank Dr Jez Littlewood and Professor 
Julian Perry Robinson for comments and various drafts of this 
article.
Option Estimated financial cost 
Status Quo $610,000 per annum 
Clarification Session $34,210 per annum
SAI Compliance $95,210 per annum
Peer Review $31,959 travel & report 
VEREX 2.0 $1,368,400 per annum
OEWG $3,245,062 per annum
The Protocol $3,245,062 per annum
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Verification Watch 
Progress investigating chemical weapons use in Syria 
Giuseppe Di Luccia, London
From 30 November to 4 December 2015, the annual Confer-
ence of the States Parties (CSP) to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) met in The Hague. Responding to the 
latest reports from the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), 
representatives of states parties and other participating or-
ganisations—such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross—discussed the situation in Syria. While commending 
the work of the FFM in establishing the facts behind the 
allegations and of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigation 
Mechanism (JIM) in identifying those responsible, state par-
ties continued to raise concerns over the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. As a result of the FFM’s three reports, the 
CSP established a special fund for the OPCW special missions 
in order to meet the costs arising from such ‘unforeseen ac-
tivities’. 
The FFM’s three latest reports, issued on 29 October 2015, 
made conclusions on the use of chemical weapons with 
varying degrees of confidence in two of the three reports. The 
first report covered the investigation of multiple alleged in-
cidents of chemical weapons use in the Idlib province of 
Syria, in the period between March and May 2015. Despite 
the inability of the team to visit the location due to the com-
plex security conditions in the country, the investigation 
nevertheless confirmed that the use of one or more chemi-
cals—probably chlorine—as a weapon was ‘likely’ in the 
incident in Sarmin, a village within Idlib province. The use 
of these chemicals as weapons resulted in the deaths of six 
people, all from the same family.
The second report confirmed, ‘with utmost confidence’, that 
at least two people were exposed in the city of Marea to sul-
fur mustard, a blister agent (also known as a vesicant) that 
burns the skin or other parts of the body. The report also 
added that the death of an infant was ‘very likely’ due to 
similar exposure. In this case, the team was able to interview 
the casualties fairly quickly after the events took place and 
witnessed the collection of biomedical samples, thereby im-
proving the credibility of the test results. 
The third report was circulated on 29 October 2015, follow-
ing the Syrian government’s allegations of an attack against 
its soldiers in Jober. In this interim report, the OPCW’s FFM 
stated that it ‘cannot confidently determine whether or not 
a chemical was used as a weapon.’
The establishment of the FFM, announced by the OPCW-
Director General Ahmet Üzümcü on 29 April 2014, pro-
vided a mandate restricted to the verification of the allegations 
concerning the use of chemical weapons in Syria, without 
attributing such acts to any party. The FFM confirmed the 
use of chemical weapons in June and September 2014, but 
so far the UN Security Council has not been able to agree on 
referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal 
Court. If they had, then this would have set about procedures 
that could establish accountability. The UN Security Coun-
cil was, however, able to unanimously agree on resolution 
2235 on 7 August 2015, which establishes the one-year Joint 
Investigative Mechanism. This joint body between the UN 
and the OPCW has been tasked with identifying ‘individuals, 
entities, groups, or governments involved in the use of 
Upcoming events
The OPCW Headquarters in The Hague. Image: Roel Wijnants
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Upcoming eventschemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic 
chemical.’ 
The JIM became fully operational on 13 November 2015 
under the leadership of Virginia Gamba, Director of the Of-
fice of Disarmament Affairs and Deputy to the High Repre-
sentative for Disarmament Affairs for the UN. Ms Gamba is 
the head of a 3-person Leadership Panel, and has a staff 
composed of 24 professionals selected for their high degree 
of expertise and varied geographic origins.
As the UN’s acting High Representative for Disarmament, 
Kim Won-soo explained to the Security Council on 2 De-
cember, that the joint body had begun its work collecting 
information from the OPCW’s database and analysing the 
reports submitted by the FFM. Pursuant to resolution 2235, 
the first report will be presented to the UNSC within 90 days 
of the date on which the JIM became operational, which will 
be on 13 February 2016. On 11 December, the UN and the 
Syrian government signed an agreement in New York that 
will enable the JIM expert team to conduct its activities with 
the support of local authorities. It remains to be seen wheth-
er the unstable internal situation will allow this mission to 
be accomplished. •
Paris Agreement: a new global action plan to tacke 
climate change?
Joy Hyvarinen, London
The UN Paris climate change conference concluded on 12 
December 2015 with the adoption of a new legally binding 
climate change treaty, known as the Paris Agreement. The 
new agreement is the outcome of negotiations that started 
in 2011, in recognition that stronger efforts to reduce green-
house gas emissions are needed to limit global temperature 
increases and to manage the risks of climate change.
The Paris Agreement has been widely welcomed, though 
some have pointed to the absence of binding targets as a 
weakness. The hope is that, under the new agreement, 
countries will submit increasingly ambitious plans to com-
bat climate change, which, taken together, will limit the 
global average temperature increase to well below 2°C, pos-
sibly even 1.5°C. Countries are expected to submit such plans 
at five-year intervals; each successive plan is meant to rep-
resent a progression when compared with the previous one.
Countries such as the US, China and India were able to 
agree to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which many 
have highlighted as one of its most important achievements. 
In the past, differences in view between developing and 
developed countries about their respective contributions to 
combating climate change in the future have been an ob-
stacle to reaching agreement in the international negotia-
tions—with the US, China and India among those playing 
a prominent role in the discussions. 
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) recognised developed countries’ historical re-
sponsibility for climate change and required them to take 
the lead in combating it. With the growth in greenhouse 
gas emissions in developing countries since then, developed 
countries have argued that the UNFCCC’s strict distinction 
between developing and developed countries should no 
longer apply. 
The Paris Agreement softens this distinction considerably. 
The agreement recognises differences between developing 
and developed countries, but contains common rules. For 
example, all countries, not just developed countries, are 
required to prepare and submit climate plans (referred to as 
‘nationally determined contributions’) that publicly outline 
what post-2020 climate action they intend to take. 
The common rules in the agreement include what is referred 
to as an ‘enhanced transparency framework’, but this also 
recognises differences between developing and developed 
countries. The rules of the enhanced transparency frame-
work contained in the Paris Agreement require each coun-
try that joins the agreement to provide a national inven-
tory report and information necessary to track progress on 
its climate plan. Countries are also expected to provide 
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information on support provided or received in the areas of 
finance, technology transfer and capacity-building. 
In addition, the Paris conference adopted a decision that 
accompanies the new agreement. The decision includes a 
new Capacity-building Initiative that is specifically focused 
on supporting developing countries to meet the enhanced 
transparency requirements under the Paris Agreement. The 
capacity-building initiative will aim to strengthen national 
institutions; provide tools, training and assistance; and assist 
in the improvement of transparency over time. 
According to the agreement, the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
shall, at its first session, adopt common modalities, proce-
dures and guidelines for the transparency framework. The 
decision that accompanies the Paris Agreement requests the 
ad hoc working group that will prepare for entry into force 
of the agreement to develop recommendations regarding 
this. 
The Paris Agreement is meant to come into effect and be 
implemented from 2020—this assumes that enough coun-
tries join to bring the agreement into force by then. This 
allows time for preparatory work, such as elaborating the 
modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency 
framework. This will be an important task for the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Paris Agreement. A well-functioning 
transparency framework will make it possible to monitor 
progress and compare efforts among countries, and it will 
help to build trust. •
A photo of the Twenty-Frst Session of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) and the Eleventh 
Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 11). Image credit: United Nations
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Code in the aftermath of the attacks. The 2004 Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act aimed at the unifica-
tion and coordination of the US intelligence and law en-
forcement agencies against terrorism. More specifically, in 
response to the widespread fear of use of radiological weap-
ons by non-state actors, this 235-page Act included the 
Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons Act 
of 2004, which amended the US Code by adding section 
2332h (the first count against Mr Crawford). Likewise, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, through 
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement 
Act of 2004, amended section 2332a (the second count 
against Mr Crawford) which was originally introduced by 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994. 
Furthermore, the 2005 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) re-
quires states parties to criminalise and penalise acts that use 
radioactive material to cause harm. The US signed the agree-
ment on 14 September 2005. On 2 June 2015, the Senate 
passed implementing legislation for ICSANT and approved 
ratification of the Convention, ready for the recent ratifica-
tion on 30 September 2015. 
While section 2332h enables prosecution and conviction for 
the possession of a device designed to release radiation with 
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, the im-
plementing legislation for ICSANT creates new criminal 
offenses regarding the possession and the use not only of 
radiation-emitting devices, but also of radioactive material. 
Furthermore, it criminalises attempts, threats, and con-
spiracies to commit these offenses. Section 2332i also adds 
new grounds for jurisdiction, new definitions and cases in 
which the provisions do not apply, namely ‘activities of 
armed forces during an armed conflict and activities under-
taken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their 
official duties.’
 
The availability of radiological dispersal devices and radio-
logical materials by non-state actors poses a serious challenge 
to international and national security. States focus their 
efforts on initiatives that provide the greatest potential for 
protecting their citizens from radiological attacks. Among 
them the provisions contained in Title 18 of the US Code, 
as amended in compliance with the obligations contained 
in ICSANT, reinforce the prevention and prosecution of 
crimes that involve the possession and the use of radio-
logical weapons. •
‘Hiroshima on a light switch’ condemned in US court
Giuseppe Di Luccia, London 
In August 2015, Mr Glendon Scott Crawford was convicted 
by a jury in the US for his attempt to produce and use a 
radiological dispersal device. Mr Crawford is the first person 
convicted for producing and using such a device under 
Title VI, Subtitle J of the US Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act (Prevention of Terrorist Access to 
Destructive Weapons Act of 2004).
The 51-year-old industrial mechanic from Galway, New York, 
created a remote initiation device that could activate a com-
mercially available X-ray machine that he acquired to expose 
his targets, Muslim communities in the state of New York, 
to radiation. A key point of his plan was for the victims to 
be initially unaware of the radiation exposure, as symptoms 
would only appear days later. This would help maximise the 
damage caused by the device. With help from accomplice 
Mr Eric J. Feight, Mr Crawford managed to build and test 
the remote initiation device, which was powered by an 
electrical source for a plug-in cigarette lighter. He called the 
weaponised device ‘Hiroshima on a light switch.’
However, Mr Crawford acquired the X-ray machine from 
an undercover FBI agent, who had made the X-ray machine 
ineffective. A 14-month investigation involving two FBI 
field offices and numerous undercover agents engaged in 
recording secret meetings, phone calls, text messages and 
e-mails was launched in April 2012—resulting in three 
charges against the defendant. Mr Crawford was ultimate-
ly convicted of attempted production and use of a radio-
logical dispersal device in violation of Title 18 of the United 
States Code section 2332h(a) and (c)(1); conspiracy to use a 
weapon of mass destruction under section 2332a(a)(2)(c); 
and distribution of information relating to weapons of mass 
destruction under section 842(p)(2)(a). 
Mr Crawford is scheduled to be sentenced on 16 March 
2016. He faces at least 25 years of imprisonment on the first 
count, up to life imprisonment on the first and second 
counts, and up to 20 years on the third count.
While the third count is based on prohibitions introduced 
to the US Code before 9/11, the first and the second counts 
stem from the violation of provisions included in the US 
Implementation Watch 
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Noble gas detection for CTBT monitoring 
David Keir, Oslo
On 6 January 2016, the Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
(CTBTO) announced that its International Monitoring 
System (IMS) had detected ‘unusual seismic activity in the 
Korean peninsula’. The Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) claimed this was the country’s fourth nu-
clear test. 
The reaction of the international community to the alleged 
nuclear test has once again underscored the need to maintain 
effective monitoring and detection systems for such explo-
sions. The earliest signs of an underground nuclear test tend 
to be identified through seismic monitoring. However, the 
detection of radionuclides, and in particular of radiosotopes 
of xenon, can supply the ‘smoking gun’ that can conclu-
sively confirm whether a detected seismic event is of nu-
clear origin. In April 2013, the Preparatory Commission for 
the CTBTO stated that detection of radionuclides can 
provide ‘clear evidence’ of a nuclear explosion. This point 
was then highlighted during the latest meeting of the In-
ternational Noble Gas Experiment (INGE), held in Austin, 
Texas, in December 2015. This experiment has been blazing 
a trail for over a decade in the use of xenon to detect un-
derground nuclear explosions. 
 
The isotopes of xenon of interest here—xenon-131m, xe-
non-133, xenon-133m, xenon-135—are produced during the 
nuclear fission of uranium-235 when a nuclear explosive 
device is detonated. Unlike many of the other resulting 
radioisotopes, xenon is chemically inert and so (because it 
does not bond chemically to the underground surfaces of 
rock and soil in a buried test explosion) it will eventually 
seep out into the open air.
 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) al-
Science & Technology Scan
ways foresaw the development of a network of noble gas 
systems intended to measure radioactive xenon. However, 
at the time when the IMS began to be developed in the 
early 2000s, no such technology existed. Four national teams 
were working on the method, but there was no consensus 
on the details of how to collect and measure xenon during 
or after an underground explosion.
 
In 1999, personnel of the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
(PTS) of the CTBTO came up with the idea of an interna-
tional experiment in which different analytical methods 
could be compared and then prototype equipment could 
gradually be developed, tested and moved onto the next 
stage, in which CTBT monitoring operators could use it. 
This was the genesis of the INGE. 
 
In the first stage, inventors and developers from France, 
Russia, Sweden and the United States held collegial scien-
tific debates where concepts were compared, and leaps 
forward in collection and measurement capability were 
made. This led to the production of four different prototype 
systems for detecting radioxenon. As the various systems 
were made available for testing by independent operators 
from across the world, a broader group of experts was 
formed. These scientists and engineers created software to 
analyse levels of xenon isotopes detected at specific geo-
graphical locations at specific times and dates, and then 
created databases to tabulate and store great volumes of 
results. A definite breakthrough occurred when the group 
began to use sophisticated atmospheric backtracking, via 
computer models, to home in on the geographical point of 
origin of xenon releases.
 
Like other scientific collaborations, INGE members have 
published papers on all aspects of their experiments, from 
theories to hardware, to global analysis of background ra-
dioactivity. A major thread in these publications has been 
how to discriminate signals of nuclear explosive debris from 
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the emissions of xenon from legitimate civilian nuclear 
activity.
 
Since the INGE has been in operation, there have been a 
number of important events that have put the detection of 
radioxenon to the test. These include the three nuclear tests 
that were announced by the DPRK in 2006, 2009 and 
2013—the latter two of which were detected by IMS xenon 
systems. The Fukushima reactor releases in March 2011 
provided another stress test for these systems and their 
calibration. Investigating the DPRK’s alleged fourth nu-
clear test will provide another trial for the systems and their 
capacity. 
 
The job of developing noble gas detection for CTBT 
monitoring is not over yet. Customising xenon equipment 
for on site inspection (OSI), global background radioactiv-
ity studies, and other challenges have come into focus just 
in the last couple of years. One particular interesting area 
for further consideration is the use of argon, specifically 
argon-37, detection in OSI activities. This isotope is made 
when neutrons strike calcium atoms in the rocks and min-
erals underground, and presents a completely independent 
signature of a nuclear explosion.
 
Another issue of concern is that the original prototype 
equipment is getting old. At present, all four original na-
tional developers are working on next generation equipment. 
This new equipment will have attributes like delivering more 
xenon per unit of electrical power, use fewer consumables, 
and be easier for the PTS to maintain in far-flung locations.•
Programme News
Verification and Monitoring Programme
During this quarter, the Verification and Monitoring (VM) 
team worked on and then launched VERTIC’s latest pub-
lication under its project on multilateral verification of 
disarmament, Verification Matters No. 12: Exploring multi-
lateral verification of nuclear disarmament: scenarios, model-
ling and simulations. This major publication discusses 
progress on an ambitious methodology, with several useful 
applications, under development over the past years of 
research by VERTIC. 
In addition, the team has continued to carry out and review 
surveys on countries’ national approaches to the implemen-
tation of IAEA nuclear safeguards. We have also been busy 
preparing for two Technical Assistance Visits on nuclear 
non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards, to be conducted 
in January 2016 in Africa.
On 10-13 November 2015, Researcher Alberto Muti took 
part in the 6th annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards 
Network, held in Tokyo, Japan. During the meeting, Mr. 
Muti presented on VERTIC’s work on safeguards imple-
mentation, and on the database of national implementation 
approaches that VERTIC is using to inform and support 
its assistance to countries. 
On 16 November, Executive Director Andreas Persbo pre-
sented on progress made under VERTIC’s project on 
multilateral disarmament verification to the International 
Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification plenary 
meeting in Oslo, Norway. Principal Scientist David Keir 
also participated in meeting activities. 
The VM team has also continued to engage on VERTIC’s 
project on a UK-China scholarly dialogue on verification 
in the security field, after its successful September meeting. 
This quarter also saw VERTIC work on guidance and 
Breaking News: DPRK announces fourth test
On January 6, 2016, the Vienna-based Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) 
reported on ‘unusual seismic activity in the Korean peninsula’. 
The DPRK state-run news agency, KCNA, has issued an official 
announcement claiming this was the country’s first test of a Hy-
drogen bomb. The CTBTO has announced that its experts are 
analysing the data they possess, and will provide information to 
the public through a dedicated webpage. 
VERTIC’s analysis of CTBT verifcation:http.//bit.ly/1kMEkp6 
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monitoring on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD), and establish cooperation with the 
Sustainable Tropics Alliance. The Sustainable Tropics Alli-
ance is a strategic partnership of leading independent non-
governmental organisations working at the local, national 
and global level to develop new approaches to low-emission 
rural development in the tropics. Within the alliance, VER-
TIC focuses on verification, implementation and monitor-
ing, mainly in the areas of climate change and sustainable 
development, including how international frameworks can 
support transitions to low emission rural development and 
how on-the-ground experience can inform international 
processes.
The team was also heavily involved in finalising and launch-
ing VERTIC’s new serial publication Verification & Imple-
mentation, which brings together leading practitioners and 
experts from the field to explain, appraise and propose 
ideas for strengthening the verification and implementation 
of international agreements and treaties. For more informa-
tion, see the publication news on this issue of Trust & 
Verify. •
National Implementation Programme
During this quarter, the NIM team completed one legisla-
tion survey on the implementation of international instru-
ments for nuclear security, three legislation surveys on the 
implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) and one legislation survey on the implementation 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In addition, 
the team sent universality packages to three African states: 
two for adherence to the BWC, and one for adherence to 
the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material and the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
On 8-9 October, Senior Legal Officer Sonia Drobysz par-
ticipated in a workshop on the National Chemical, Bio-
logical, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Strategy and 
National Action Plan of the Republic of Moldova in Chisi-
nau, with experts from the European Union, UNICRI, the 
OSCE, UNODA and the 1540 Committee Group of Ex-
perts. She presented on ‘Strengthening the implementation 
of UNSCR 1540 and related CBRN instruments in Moldo-
va’.
On 14-16 October, NIM Programme Director Scott Spence 
attended the Wilton Park conference on ‘The Australia 
Group: challenges and future directions’. The following 
week, from 20-22 October, Sonia and Senior Legal Officer 
Yasemin Balci travelled to Dakar, Senegal, to assist the na-
tional commission on nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons in drafting a bill for the implementation of the 
BWC. 
Scott was also in Africa on 29-30 October, to participate in 
a workshop on the universalisation of the BWC in Africa 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, organised by the Commission of 
the African Union and the BWC Implementation Support 
Unit. He presented on the national implementation of the 
BWC and on VERTIC’s legislative assistance to implement 
CBRN international instruments.
On 19-20 November, Sonia was in Cologne, Germany, for 
a conference on ‘Legal Issues of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy’ organised by the International Law Association’s 
Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and 
Contemporary International Law. She gave a presentation 
on ‘A framework for the secure development of nuclear 
energy: obligations and challenges’.
On 23-24 November, Scott went to Dhaka to work with the 
Government of Bangladesh in drafting a BWC bill. Short-
ly after, he travelled to El Salvador on 30 November to 1 
December to participate in the 37th Annual Parliamentary 
Forum on the role of parliamentarians in support of peace 
and security, with a focus on the Arms Trade Treaty and the 
BWC. Scott presented on the national implementation of 
the BWC. 
On 9-10 December, Scott took part in the 3rd Myanmar-US/
UK Nonproliferation Dialogue in Yangon, Myanmar, and 
presented on the national implementation measures for the 
CWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Scott also 
took part in the first and second of these dialogues in 2013 
and 2014.
 
From 14-18 December, Scott represented VERTIC at the 
BWC Meeting of States Parties in Geneva and gave the 
charity’s statement to plenary. This is the last of such meet-
ings during the 2012-2015 intersessional process before next 
year’s Eighth Review Conference. •
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On 16 November 2015, VERTIC published Verification 
Matters No. 12: Exploring multilateral verification of nuclear 
disarmament: scenarios, modelling and simulations. The report 
provides a guide for developing simulation exercises to 
consider the technical, legal and political challenges involved 
in verifying nuclear disarmament. It explains how creating 
nuclear disarmament ‘scenarios’ and technical models of 
nuclear programmes can provide detailed and comprehen-
sive environments in which to run these simulations. It also 
discusses questions that need to be addressed while explor-
ing disarmament verification options to ensure that any 
proposed solutions are reliable, coherent, trusted and acces-
sible. 
The report was prepared by Hugh Chalmers, David Keir, 
Larry MacFaul, Russell Moul, and Alberto Muti, with the 
contribution of VERTIC Executive Director Andreas 
Persbo and Deputy Executive Director Angela Woodward 
through VERTIC’s project on multilateral verification of 
nuclear disarmament, supported by the Norwegian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs. 
Verification Matters No. 12 is available on the VERTIC 
Publications News
website in PDF and e-reader formats. 
On 16 December 2015, VERTIC launched Verification & 
Implementation, a biennial publication that brings together 
leading practitioners and experts from the field to explain, 
appraise and propose ideas for strengthening the verification 
and implementation of international agreements and trea-
ties. 
As the preface to the publication says: ‘the implementation 
and verification of these arrangements builds confidence 
and know-how, allowing the international community to 
work cooperatively toward mutual goals. Informed and in-
novative approaches to verification and implementation that 
draw on technical, legal, political and economic insights 
will help to strengthen and sustain this framework. 
Nurturing a wide range of technical, legal, political and 
economic tools will help the international community sup-
port cooperative approaches to shared security challenges. 
Tackling these challenges requires a sound appreciation of 
the interests of governments and other stakeholders, and 
how they interact with one another. It requires identifying 
the approaches that worked in the past and those that did 
not, and how verification and implementation systems 
should evolve to remain efficient and effective. Assistance 
must be made available to governments and other stakehold-
14
Verification and Implementation chapters include:
Foreword
Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General, OPCW
Iran and the Evolution of Safeguards
Mark Hibbs, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment
Securing the Front End of Iran’s Fuel Cycle
Andreas Persbo, Executive Director, VERTIC 
Hugh Chalmers, Senior Researcher, VERTIC 
In Defence of the Evolution of IAEA Safeguards
Craig Everton, Director, Australian Safeguards and Non-Prolif-
eration Office 
The Role of Organisations Culture in Effectively Implementing 
Safety, Security, and Safeguards in New Nuclear Power Coun-
tries
Donald Kovacic, Nuclear Engineer, Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory 
Investigating Multilateral Verification of Nuclear Disarma-
ment: Fuel Cycle Modelling for Simulations
David Keir, Principal Scientist, VERTIC 
Russell Moul, Researcher, VERTIC
Dealing with Objections to the CTBT
Edward Ifft, Adjunct Professor, School of Foreign Services at 
Georgetown University, former US State Department
Chemical Demilitarisation in Syria: An Overview
Dominique Anelli, Head of Chemical Demilitarisation Branch, 
OPCW 
Mehran Rouzbhani, Team Leader, OPCW Inspectorate Division 
Biological Weapons Convention Implementing Legislation 
and Compliance
Angela Woodward, Deputy Executive Director, VERTIC
The Arms Trade Treaty: Making a Difference
Jo Adamson OBE, UK Ambassador to Mali
Guy Pollard MBE, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
Fundamentals of Cyber Security
Dave Clemente, Senior Research Analyst, International Security 
Forum 
ers who might otherwise struggle to participate in collective 
approaches to security to the extent they would like.
These issues are being addressed by a wide and multidisci-
plinary community of organisations and individuals com-
mitted to finding ways of galvanising and sustaining pur-
poseful collective action toward a more peaceful and produc-
tive future. In this context, VERTIC is re-launching its book 
series focusing on international agreements for global secu-
rity and development. Verification and Implementation 
presents an accessible set of essays, authored by leading 
practitioners and experts from the community that explain 
and analyse the verification and national implementation 
mechanisms that make international arrangements work in 
practice. The essays also throw light on how emerging de-
velopments in technology, industry, business and society 
around the world may impact this field, both in terms of 
new risks to international agreements and new opportuni-
ties to strengthen them. While the essays contained in the 
publication typically take an interdisciplinary approach to 
their subjects, some turn their focus toward one particular 
perspective—be it legal, political, or technical.
 
Readers of this publication will find practical analysis that 
can assist them in addressing or researching current chal-
lenges faced by the international community. 
The first edition of Verification & Implementation can be 
found on the VERTIC website in both PDF and e-reader 
formats. 
A launch event took place on the same day in London and 
included a discussion of the volume by Acting Programme 
Director and Editor-in-Chief Larry MacFaul and Executive 
Director Andreas Persbo, as well as a presentation from 
Mark Hibbs, Senior Associate in the Nuclear Policy Pro-
gramme at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, on his chapter ‘Iran and the Evolution of Safeguards’. 




“The challenge will be, as it is for any verification effort, 
proving the negative. The agency will have to redouble its 
efforts to verify not only that there are no undeclared nu-
clear materials or activities in Iran but that Iran is not 
carrying out any activities that are prohibited under the 
JCPOA (…)”. Laura Rockwood, Executive Director, 
VCDNP, and former Section Head for Non-Prolifera-
tion and Policy Making in the IAEA Office of Legal 
Affairs, during the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarma-
ment Conference 2015 Third Plenary Session, “The Iran 
Deal - Outcomes and Next Steps”, 12 November 2015.
“(…) the longstanding divergence of views on the merits 
of a legally binding verification mechanism should not 
prevent States Parties from considering proposals of other 
ways to improve confidence in compliance. (…)”. State-
ment by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weap-
ons and on Their Destruction, 14-18 December 2015, 
Geneva
“We’ve always said that this deal isn’t based on trust: but 
rather on intense verification of Iran’s programme. That’s 
why we’re working so closely with the IAEA, to make sure 
it has everything it needs, to do this crucial job.” Dec. 17, 
2015: Stephen D. Mull, Lead Coordinator for Iran 
Nuclear Implementation testifies before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on ‘The Status of JCPOA 
Implementation and Related Issues’. 
“When fully implemented, the JCPOA will dramatically 
scale back Iran’s nuclear programme, and  provide unprec-
edented monitoring and verification tools to ensure that it 
is exclusively peaceful as it moves forward”  Mr. Van Bo-
hemen (New Zealand), UNSC meeting on  Non-pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction Briefing by 
the Chair of the Security Council Committee estab-
lished pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), 22 December 
2015
Angela Woodward, Christchurch
VERTIC staff and trustees sadly note the passing of former 
VERTIC trustee John Edmonds, CVO CMG, on 17 August 
2015, aged 94. John had an illustrious career spanning serv-
ice in the Royal Navy during and after the Second World 
War, and successive posts at the Foreign Office, as it was 
then called, which he joined in 1959. 
In 1974, he was appointed to head the Foreign Office’s Arms 
Control and Disarmament Department and was then named 
Managing Director of the nascent Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG), which was set up in 1975 and administered by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The NSG was a rare 
instance of foreign policy convergence by the five nuclear-
weapon states during the Cold War. 
In 1975, he was on the delegation to the First Review Con-
ference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and 
later led the UK delegation to the trilateral CTBT negotia-
tions from 1978, when he was appointed a personal rank of 
ambassador until 1981. By this time the negotiations were 
fruitless, largely due to the discord between the US and 
Soviet Union over the latter’s invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. Following his retirement from diplomatic service in 
1981, John lectured and wrote on arms control, often along-
side fellow longstanding VERTIC trustee, General Sir Hugh 
Beach. 
John was a member of VERTIC’s Oversight and Advisory 
Board (OAB) from the inception of the organisation in 1986, 
and became a trustee when the Board of Directors and the 
OAB merged in 1997. After 14 years of dedicated service, he 
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This December, VERTIC said goodbye to employee of five years, Yasemin Balci. Yasemin served on the National Imple-
mentation Measures team as a Senior Legal Officer. An invaluable contributor to the programme’s work, Yasemin worked 
tirelessly on numerous technical assistance visits across the globe. We are sure she will go onto great things in her new 
position at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
VERTIC has also welcomed a new employee on the National Implementation Measures team, Giuseppe di Luccia, as a 
new Assistant Legal Officer. Giuseppe came to VERTIC as an intern, and has now taken on a short-term contract to as-
sist with the programme’s projects. He is a recent graduate of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies 
in Bologna. We look forward to working with him.  
This January, VERTIC celebrates its thirtieth birthday. We would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people 
that have been involved with the organisation over the years. Here’s to thirty more! •
